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Policy and methods: Choices for legislatures 
Introduction 
The Politics of Law and Legal Policy Special Workshop is charged with 
considering "which political, organizational and normative solutions allow 
forceful realization of social and political goals without breaking principles 
of democracy and the rule of law." Several areas of law, e.g., information 
technology, biogenetic technology, energy and ecology, require state atten-
tion, yet the legislature is not yet in position, and may never be, to provide 
a complete set of legal rules governing them. 
Today I would like to identify choices of legal methods that legislatures 
have in adopting and subsequently implementing of policy legislation. 
I base my remarks principally on my experiences with and study of antitrust 
law in the United States and Germany. Twenty-five years ago - fresh from 
several years as attorney with the Antitrust Division of the United States 
Department of Justice - at the Max Planck Institute in Munich I investigated 
possible reasons why antitrust law then was subject to so much more criti-
cism in the United States than in Germany. I presented the results of my 
study as a doctoral dissertation at the University of Munich under Professor 
Dr. Wolfgang Fikentscher1; I published them in English as Policy and Methods 
* This essay is a revised version of remarks presented at the Politics of Law and Legal Policy 
Special Workshop, XXIII World Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, 4 August 
2007, Krak6w. It retains the discussion format. The time available for revision did not permit more 
exhaustive analysis or footnoting. 
1 J. Maxeiner, Rechtspolitik und Methoden im deutschen und amerikanischen Kartellrecht: eine ver-
gleichende Betrachtung (Diss. Miinchen, 1986). 
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in German and American Antitrust Law: A Comparative Study2. The general 
conclusion that I reached, based on my study of antitrust law, was that the 
choice of methods by which a law is applied, particularly when a purpose of 
the law is to advance public policy, can have significant impact on how that 
law is accepted and on how well it functions in implementing policy. The 
two decades that have passed since then seem to validate my conclusion. 
In that time U.S. antitrust law has receded in importance, while German 
antitrust law has been embraced by the European Union, and through the 
European Union, now has force right here in Krak6w. Two decades ago no 
one would have foreseen such a possibility. 
While my conclusion that legal methods affect law implementation 
seems obvious, surprisingly few jurists recognize and act on it. Lawyers 
go about their business with the legal methods that they know and do not 
think about alternative methods. Yet comparison of legal methods amply 
demonstrates that legislatures have a choice of approaches. While I identify 
choices, and sometimes suggest which I think are preferable in fulfilling the 
Special Workshop's charge3, I do not suggest that any particular choice is 
itself essential. Whichever choices are made, however, they will affect how 
forceful and successful policy implementation is. 
The Policy Problem 
Balancing policy, democracy and the rule of law is a daunting task. The 
rule of law, in particular the legal certainty aspect of the rule of law, demands 
a certain rigidity in law so that people can plan their lives with confidence that 
their actions are lawful and that they will be left in peace by government.4 
Yet policy requires a certain flexibility in decision-making to deal with the 
unforeseen. I cannot improve on Gustav Radbruch's formulation of the prob-
lem: "Legal certainty demands positivity, yet positive law claims to be valid 
without regard to its justice or expediency [Le., public policy]"s. Radbruch 
2 New York: Praeger, 1986. 
3 I assume here that these choices are essentially available within the existing legal system. 
4 See generally, J.R. Maxeiner, 'Legal Indeterminacy Made in America: U.s. Legal Methods 
and the Rule of Law', 41 ValparaiSO 1. Rev. 517 (2006); 'Legal Certainty: A European Alternative to 
American Legal Indeterminacy?', 15 Tulane J. Int'l & Compo 1. 541 (2007). 
5 G. Radbruch, Legal Philosophy § 9, in 4 The Legal Philosophies of Lask, Radbruch, and 
Dabin, 20th Century Legal Philosophy Series 109 (Kurt Wilk trans., 1950). Originally published as 
Rechtsphilosophie § 9 (3,d ed. 1932), reprinted in 2 G. Radbruch, Gesamtausgabe (Arthur Kaufmann, ed. 
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saw an inescapable tension - "antimony" - among justice, legal certainty 
and policy. 
The tension between legal certainty and policy is perhaps more severe 
than is the tension between legal certainty and justice. The policy tension is 
the focus of my remarks today; the tension with justice I treat only inciden-
tally. Why might the tension between legal certainty and policy be greater 
than the tension between legal certainty and justice? Because legal certainty 
is a bulwark against the state. Policy - a claim of the society as a whole - can 
be and is used to trump individual claims against the state. Here in Poland 
you have witnessed this repeatedly in the recent past. Nazi occupiers said 
"Everything useful to the [German] people is right; everything that injures 
them is wrong;" Home-grown Communists called for" socialist legality." 
Under both regimes, law became politics. That sometimes happens even 
under more benign regimes. 
The policy problem is not only that policy threatens the rule of law; 
it has another side. Maladroit attention to justice and legal certainty them-
selves threaten policy. Many an American antitrust policy decision has been 
impeded by an unnecessary conjunction with a decision of individual cul-
pability. 
My prior work did not focus on democracy and I have no particular 
knowledge in balancing democratic legitimacy with policy. Yet the Special 
Workshop's charge does incorporate democracy. I do have some thoughts 
on that theme which I will provide. 
Legal Methods 
Before turning to the choices of legal methods available, let me specify 
what I mean by legal methods. Broadly speaking, legal methods are devices 
used to apply abstract legal rules to factual situations in order to decide con-
crete cases6• Legal methods as the means to decide concrete cases include, 
in a broad sense, creating as well as implementing legal rules. I consider 
legal methods under three rubrics: law making, law finding, and law applying. 
Legal methods are the principal means by which law content is made clear 
and by which law application is made predictable. 
1993}; 8th ed. 1975 (Erik Wolf, ed.). Here I translate what Radbruch called ZweckmiijJigkeit as policy, 
although the literal translation might be expediency. 
6 See 1 W Fikentscher, Methoden des Rechts in vergleichender Darstellung 13-15 (1975). 
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Lawmaking is legislative. The legislature adopts a statute, or an admin-
istrative authority adopts a regulation pursuant to a statute. The statute or 
regulation applies not just to one case, but to a generality of cases. Law-
finding is a determination by a decision-maker of the applicable rule of law 
for a particular case and any necessary interpretation of the rule. It may 
include creating new rules of general applicability where none already 
exists. Law-applying is application of found rules to decide particular cases. 
Most commonly this process presupposes a process for fact-finding as well 
as law-finding. The facts found are then related to applicable law. Law 
applying may require that the decision maker value a particular case, for 
example, by determining that an actor was "negligent" or that the effect on 
competition is "unreasonable." 
Legal methods help make decisions. I distinguish among three dif-
ferent kinds of decisions: legal, equitable and policy. Purely legal decisions 
require no valuing by decision makers. They are acts of recognition. Rules 
(i.e., norms) give the answers: the rules require no interpretation to under-
stand their requirements, the rules require no valuing by decision makers 
for their application, and the rules grant decision makers no discretion in 
the consequences of their application. Purely legal decisions correspond to 
Montesquieu's vision of judges as the "mouthpiece of the statute." Statutes 
decide all issues of equity and policy. Montesquieu's ideal proved unachiev-
able. We now acknowledge that statutes cannot decide all issues. Sometimes 
statutes are necessarily indefinite and require concretization in regulation or 
legal decision. Sometimes statutes direct decision makers to value conduct in 
addition to determining what that conduct was. Sometimes statutes author-
ize decision makers to choose among a range of measures to order. 
Valuing decisions provide less legal certainty than do strictly legal deci-
sions. Strictly legal decisions rest on factual determinations and should be 
largely independent of decision makers. Valuing decisions depend on how 
individual decision makers assess particular cases. As noted, I divide these 
valuing decisions into two classes: equity decisions and policy decisions. 
Where strictly legal decisions are relaxed for the sake of justice in individual 
cases, I see equity decisions. Where they are loosened to permit adjustment 
of decisions for the sake of general welfare, I see policy decisions. Equity 
decisions are decisions made, not according to rules, but for the sake of the 
best possible result as between the parties present before the decision maker. 
Policy decisions, in the widest sense, are choices that take into account and 
even may prefer interests that are not before the decision maker. They are 
decisions for society at large - the general welfare. 
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This distinction between equity and policy is apparent in a distinc-
tion that American jurists make between antitrust law, on the one hand, 
and unfair competition law, on the other. The principal focus of antitrust 
law is said to be the protection of the free market, that is, the protection 
of competition as such, and not the protection of individual competitors 
or individual consumers. The principal focus of unfair competition laws 
(such as trademark law), on the other hand, is the protection of individual 
competitors and individual consumers. 
Now I would like to identify choices that legislatures have in policy 
legislation by posing a series of questions. I do not provide answers to these 
questions. Today I have limited goals: raising awareness that legal methods 
do matter for policy legislation and demonstrating that many choices are 
available. 
Methods Choices for Policy Legislation 
1. What should be the place of political parties and partisan 
politics in policy? 
Because policy concerns society at large, policy should be affected by 
politics. But party politics are by their nature partisan. Partisan politics 
(within limits) are generally considered appropriate at the time of adoption 
of policy by the legislature: after all, partisan debates are what political 
systems are about. There is reason, on the other hand, to avoid politically-
motivated decisions in the implementation of policy? Politically-motivated 
decisions may be inconsistent with each other. They may give rise to the 
suspicion of favoritatism and the belief that decisions are made for parti-
san interest and not for the public good. When partisan politics decides 
individual cases, the rule of law, democratic legitimacy and good policy 
are all threatened. 
As we shall see below, to a substantial extent the legislatures can con-
trol the role of partisan politics in policy through choices they make in 
setting rules and designating institutions and procedures for implenting 
those rules. 
7 Cj, WJ. Bahr & D.A. Balto, 'The Politics of Federal Antitrust Enforcement', 23 Harvard Journal 
of Law and Public Policy 113, 114 (1999-2000) ("Politics, in its broadest sense, should affect antitrust 
enforcement .... [but] political pressure [should] not motivate antitrust enforcement.") 
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Sometimes an overtly political decision is desirable. Then the legis-
lature can circumscribe that political decision in ways that enhance both 
legal certainty and democratic legitimacy. It can, inter alia, explicitly and 
unambiguously state who shall decide, what the criteria for that decision 
are to be and what the decision's consequences are. 
Adoption of Policy: The Who 
2. Should the legislature have a monopoly on policy adoption 
or should it, in part, delegate that function to others? 
When the legislature determines in a statute what public policy will 
be, and sets forth legal rules for the policy's implementation, it honors both 
democracy and the rule of law. The Special Workshop's charge presupposes 
that it is not possible to make all of those decisions beforehand. The legisla-
ture, nevertheless, has choices in how it adopts and implements policy. In 
adopting policy the legislature can delegate rule-making authority to other 
governmental or to non-governmental bodies. In implementing policy, it 
can use indefinite legal concepts, provide for discretion and otherwise allow 
for policy decisions in the course of law application. To the extent that the 
legislature is able to make these decisions beforehand - assuming that 
the policy so made is equally effective - the legislature better promotes 
legal certainty when it does so. Delegation of policy adoption seems a sec-
ond best solution. 
3. If the legislature delegates policy adoption, to what extent, 
to whom, and subject to what procedures should it do so? 
The more the legislature delegates policy adoption, the greater the 
challenge to democratic legitimacy is. For that reason, it ordinarily is pref-
erable to minimize such delegation. To the extent possible, the legislature 
should set the general policy and delegate only, if at all, the filling in of 
details. In any case, the rule of law demands that the legislature delegate 
such policy adoption with as much specificity as reasonably possible. 
The institution chosen for this delegation of policy adoption needs not 
be a government institution. It might be, for example, a non-governmental 
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trade association. In the latter case, even more than in the former, the legis-
lature should be careful in defining the scope of delegation. 
The legislature may determine the procedures by which the the del-
egated institution adopts policy. The legislature may require that the delega-
ted institution be legislature-like in composition (i.e., representatives of the 
regulated), that it proceed legislature-like to hear interested parties, and 
that it create law-like regulations. In this fashion the legislature may honor 
both the interests of democracy and of the rule of law. 
Adoption of Policy: The What 
4. To what extent should the legislature or its delegate 
determine all policy questions before policy is implemented? 
When the legislature determines in a statute what policy will be, and 
leaves no policy decisions for implementation, it honors both democracy 
and the rule of law. To the extent that it is able, the legislature should make 
policy that does not require policy decisions in implementation. Of course, 
the charge of this Special Workshop assumes that it is not always possible. 
5. If the legislature cannot provide for legal decisions 
exclusively in implementation of policy, should it separate legal 
decisions from policy decisions and, if so, how? 
A central assertion of my book, Policy and Methods in German and Ameri-
can Antitrust Law, was that a major advantage of German antitrust law over 
American antitrust law was the former's clear separation of policy deci-
sions fom legal and equity decisions. German antitrust law distinguished 
policy decisions from the other two forms by providing for different types 
of norms for each and by implementing those different types of norms 
through different types of decision makers, acting pursuant to different 
types of procedures, and ordering different kinds of measures. 
Fundamental to my assertion of the importance of separation of policy 
decisions is the observation that not all decisions involved in implement-
ing policy require valuing decisions. Some decisions implementing policy 
legislation can be entirely legal; policy questions need not be addressed. The 
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legislature can provide one set of norms to govern those instances that do 
not require policy determinations and another set of norms that do require 
such determinations. The former legal norms can eschew all hallmarks of 
policy flexibility, such as indefinite legal concepts and discretion. They can 
provide for individual culpability of persons subject to sanction. They can al-
low for sanctions with retrospective effect. The can provide that all decisions 
be legal and be made by judges or other persons who are local to the parties 
concerned and organizationally are distant from political responsibility. 
Through sophisticated drafting, statutes can, in effect, have it both 
ways. They can provide for an interplay of legal and policy decisions that 
subjects to legal regulation those questions for which there is general con-
sensus and imposes policy controls on those issues where flexibility is re-
quired. Many techniques can support this endeavor. Among these are: 
a. For the sake of legal certainty, prohibit all forms of a particular conduct, 
but authorize exceptions to be made on policy grounds with future 
effect. 
b. For the sake of legal certainty, permit all forms of a particular conduct, 
but authorize prohibitions to be made on policy grounds limited to 
future effect. 
c. For the sake of policy flexibility, use general clauses to authorize chal-
lenges to conduct, but for the sake of legal certainty, circumscribe the 
consequences of those decisions and limit them to future effect. 
d. For the sake of policy flexibility, grant discretion to decision makers to 
choose among different measures, but for the sake of legal certainty, 
unambigously identify the circumstances under which that discretion 
may be exercised, circumscribe the range of choices it allows, and limit 
the effect of those choices to the future. 
Implementation of Policy: The Who 
6. Whom should the legislature authorize to invoke 
and implement policy? 
One of the most important choices that the legislature has in the policy 
field is the determination of whom to authorize to implement the policy that 
it sets. Care in assigning policy decisions can both promote good policy 
while it enhances democratic legitimacy and the rule of law. By clearly 
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identifying policy decision makers beforehand, the legislature supports 
a higher level of practical legal certainty. While the law may not always 
determine what the decision makers decide, when who shall decide is clear, 
how they will decide may become clear though practice of the decision 
makers. Consideration of whom to designate as decision makers leads to 
a series of further choices. 
7. Should policy decision makers be politically responsible? 
Since we have already suggested that it is desirable not to mix parti-
san politics with policy implementation, it is counter-intuitive to ask now, 
whether policy decision makers should be politically responsible. Yet for 
policy reasons we now discuss, some measure of political accountability 
seems desirable. 
Policy decisions direct society. They decide issues for everyone; they 
are neither mere applications of existing rules to objectively determined 
facts, nor are they determination of the equities of disputes among individu-
als. As such they have wider effect than either legal or equity decisions. 
Matters of public policy are not susceptible to purely objective meas-
ures. To decide, for examples, what is the right level of competition or which 
human rights are fundamental, are judgments that can be justified and 
explained, but that cannot be proven. They are necessarily made based on 
imperfect knowledge of the present and of the future. They are legitimate 
not because they are right, but because they are reached within an accepted 
political system. 
Policy decision makers ordinarily are and, at least to some extent, 
should be politically responsible for their decisions. We should want them 
to decide within the law, but we purposely give them authority to make 
their own assessments of what is in the general welfare. We should want 
them to be able to look to us, the public, for approval. We should not want 
them to ignore the popular will. One simple way to enhance political ac-
countability without injecting partisan politics into decision making is to 
make highly visible those persons and institutions charged with making 
policy decisions. 
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8. Should policy decision makers have subject matter expertise? 
Purely legal decisions do not usually require special subject matter 
expertise. Because the legislature has already determined the criteria for 
decision, legal decision makers need only to find facts and apply law to 
those facts . While this is considerably more difficult than is generally ac-
knowledged, it still largely does not involve decision makers in the active 
shaping of society's future. It is placing one case within an existing system, 
rather than constructing a new system. Policy decisions, on the other hand, 
to some extent do demand that decision makers participate in developing 
the present system and shaping the future. They are called upon to make 
judgments for the community at large. Normally, their ability to do so is 
enhanced by expert knowledge8. 
9. Should policy decision makers be coordinated? 
One way or another, policy decisions - if not policy decision makers 
- should be coordinated. Policy decisions are decisions for society at large 
and thus should be transparent to society at large and consistent for all its 
members. Of course, we generally seek to coordinate legal decisions. Con-
sistency of legal decisions is important, too, for fulfillment of the promise 
of equal treatment. We generally coordinate legal decisions through two 
means: uniform statutes and appellate review of their application. 
This usual form of coordination of legal decisions is not easily applied 
to policy decisions. Policy decisions rest on judgments of society; they are 
not set out ready-made in statutes. If statutes and appellate review cannot 
coordinate policy decisions, another approach is necessary. One way to co-
ordinate policy decisions is to centralize them all in a single-decision maker. 
If only one decision maker decides, there is no need for coordination with 
others. But if that single decision maker is itself an institution composed 
of different people, the question is still not fully answered. How will those 
different decision makers coordinate their decisions? Should there be a hi-
erarchal relationship among them? 
8 One caveat to a preference for expert knowledge, however, might be that in ideologically-
charged policy fields, expert knowledge may be tantamount to adoption of a particular program. 
While that might enhance legal certainty, whether it would promote better policy is questionable. 
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Implementation: The How 
10. Should policy decisions be made through legal procedures? 
One approach to de-politicizing policy decisions is to make policy 
decisions pursuant to legal procedures. The legislature could require that 
the ordinary courts themselves decide pursuant to civil procedure, as is 
done in American antitrust law, or it could direct that administrative au-
thorities decide using legal-like procedures, as is done in both Amrican 
and German antitrust law. Use of legal procedures is seen to enhance rule 
of law protections. 
On the other hand, full assimilation of policy decision making proce-
dure to civil procedure is not desirable. Civil procedures give parties control 
over proceedings, which is not desirable for policy decisions. Parties can 
direct whether courts decide, for civil courts must decide cases presented 
to them. The parties can largely determine the scope of the controversy. In 
the American system they can likewise largely determine what evidence 
the court hears; in other systems, they can at least substantially affect what 
the court hears. Parties naturally focus the court's attention on the parties 
themselves. In civil procedures the decision maker has limited ability to 
consider what parties do not present. 
Policy decisions demand different kinds of proceedings. By definition 
policy decisions are concerned with effects on those not present in the hear-
ing hall. In policy proceedings, the focus should be on the public interest; 
decision makers should actively seek the information necessary for the best 
possible policy decisions. 
11. Should ordinary courts be charged with policy decisions? 
It is sometimes suggested that courts should make policy decisions. 
Indeed, in the United States, they often do. Yet the ordinary courts are ill-
suited for policy decisions. 
Judges are not politically responsible; we do not want them to be. 
We guarantee them independence. We want them to decide according to 
the law and not according to preference. We accept their independence, 
because they are bound by law, and because the effects of their decisions 
are ordinarily limited to the parties before them. 
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Judges are generalists. While in some systems they develop particular 
subject matter competencies, they are not expected to shape society's future. 
They are not chosen for subject matter competency. 
Judges are concerned with the parties before the court. Judges natu-
rally focus on the effect of their decision on the parties before the court. 
They are better-positioned to consider culpability of parties than impact 
on society. 
The judicial branch is usually decentralized. Local decision makers 
provide convenience to parties and knowledge of local conditions. De-
centralization results in a certain level of inconsistency of decision. This 
inconsistency is tolerable largely because it is concerned more with past 
conduct than with future acts, because it affects only the parties immediately 
before the court, and because appellate courts keep the level of inconsist-
ency within bounds. Such inconsistency is not tolerable for policy decisions 
having future and national effect. 
Policy decisions, by their nature, have a larger constituency. They 
require judgments about the social value of particular practices or condi-
tions. How much competition is sufficient to maintain a free market? Which 
rights are essential to a system of ordered liberty? On these issues, there 
is no inherent limit on how much evidence to take. We should not expect 
parties participating in proceedings to speak for others not present. What 
the parties see as important may be peripheral to sound decisions of the 
policy questions before the decision maker. 
Judges generally have little ability to supervise and direct the orders 
that they issue. Offices charged with executing judgments typically have 
limited resources and capabilities. Their authority is often geographically 
circumscribed. They ordinarily do not have authority to act on their own 
initiative. Accordingly, they cannot well implement policy widely. Policy 
decision makers need greater enforcement capability. They should have 
geographically broad authority. 
Conclusion 
The legal methods through which one adopts and implements policy 
decisions profoundly affect the compatibility of policy implementation with 
democratic legitimacy and legal certainty of the rule of law. Indeed, the 
choice of legal methods can be as important as the formulation of the policy 
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itself. While a good choice of methods will not heal a bad policy, it can help 
assure that a less-than-perfect choice of policy can be more forcefully real-
ized than otherwise, it can also help improve the policy choices made and 
help protect democratic legitimacy and the rule of law. 
While deficiencies in legislation or in the political system may require 
resort sometimes to policy decisions in the course of law application, leg-
islatures should minimize mixing policy decisions with law application. 
One of the simplest ways of promoting policy while safeguarding the rule 
of law is to restrict the effect of policy decisions to the future. In any case, 
policy decisions can ordinarily be expected to be better made when they 
are recognized as such, are made by institutions created to make policy 
decisions, and are reached by decision makers who can appeal to political 
responsibility as a basis for their decisions. 
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